Thesis 2: Pleasure is the most convincing example of an organic unity.
Something has intrinsic value just in case its existence wholly accounts for the existence of that value. Intrinsically good things are good in themselves; the circumstances don't matter.
An organic unity, as defined by Moore, is an intrinsically good thing whose value differs from at least one way to sum the intrinsic values of its parts.
vi This definition assumes that the parts fully compose the whole and don't overlap. The organic unity might have more, or less, intrinsic value than its parts. When it has more-as in most alleged unities-the parts' coming together results in a synergy of intrinsic value. Moore, for example, believed that a synergy results when one becomes conscious of a beautiful object; the consciousness of the object, he thought, has more intrinsic value than that of the object plus that of being conscious. vii Organic unities have been widely discussed, sometimes in the guise of discussing whether value is additive. viii However, the best candidate for organicity has been overlooked: ordinary episodes of pleasure and unpleasure. ix Pleasures seem more intrinsically valuable than the summed values of their parts. Which parts? This depends on whether pleasure phenomenology is intrinsically good, or whether the phenomenology needs something else to be good. I wrote a paper on this question but won't assume I got the answer right.
x Instead I'll show that pleasures seem organic either way.
First, suppose that something else is required to make the phenomenology pleasurable. If so, then the phenomenology alone wouldn't have intrinsic value (on my view, anyway), so it couldn't be an organic unity. However, the phenomenology conjoined with whatever makes it good would be organic. Suppose, for example, that one must like one's conscious state for it to be pleasurable. Then the conscious state conjoined with one's liking it would be intrinsically 5 good, and intrinsically good out of proportion to its parts. After all, the conscious state, and the Thesis 3: The "Hedonic Calculus" is a joke.
Analytic philosophers envy the rigor of science. Nowhere is this more evident than in references to "the hedonic calculus." We should stop using that bombastic, misleading phrase, for several reasons.
First, note that if there were a hedonic calculus, it would involve grade school arithmetic, not integrals and derivatives. The hedonic value of an outcome would be the sum of products; to find it, multiply the intensity and duration of each pleasure and unpleasure in the outcome and sum up. If the hedonic calculus extends to actions, then value would be determined by the formula for expected utility. This is also about product summing: to find the hedonic value of 7 an action, multiply the probability of each possible outcome by its hedonic value and sum up.
True, one definition of 'calculus' is "any method of calculation"-not just the method invented by Newton and Leibniz-but to my ear "the hedonic calculus" still carries pretensions to higher math. There are several sophisticated objections to this idea:
• Perhaps exact numerical relations don't exist between phenomenologically disparate pleasures. For example, there may be no fact of the matter as to whether this token of pleasurable taste is better than that token of fond remembrance. If so, then precise numbers can't be put on these experiences, at least for the purpose of comparing them to each other.
xvi
• Some ethicists think that "hedonically better than" isn't transitive; in other words, some states of affairs A, B and C are such that B is hedonically better than A, C is hedonically better than B, but C is not hedonically better than A. xvii If so, then numbers can't accurately represent their hedonic values (at least for the purpose of comparing them to 8 each other) since this would require B's number to be higher than A's, C's number to be higher than B's, but C's number not to be higher than A's. This is impossible, since "higher number than" is indisputably transitive.
• Methods of calculation seem to break down in cases involving transfinitely many people and/or eternal lives. A countable infinity of suffering people seems less bad than those same people suffering worse, even though both outcomes seem to sum up to (or approach) the same order of negative infinity. And an eternal life of intense pleasure is better than an eternal life of mild pleasure, even though the value of each seems to sum up to (or approach) the same order of infinity.
• Some other objections apply to the simplest version of the calculus but perhaps not to more complex versions. For example, some ethicists think that the temporal concentration of unpleasure makes it worse (so, continuous pain in one life has more disvalue than an equal duration of similarly intense pain distributed among many lives Suppose that someone in excruciating agony feels gradually better, improving at a constant rate, until she enjoys wonderfully intense pleasure. Identify a moment in this process when her conscious state is neither better nor worse than unconsciousness.
Assign that state the number 0. Now work forward and backward in time, assigning her state five seconds after 0 the number 1 and five seconds before -1. Then assign her state ten seconds after 0 '2' and ten seconds before 0 '-2,' and so on. These numbers represent the intensity of the base experiences. To confirm that the subject felt better at a constant rate, verify that she is indifferent among the following alternatives: having 0 for time t;
having 1 and -1 for .5t apiece; having 2 and -2 for .5t apiece, and so on.
To determine the hedonic value of any state of affairs, order the experiences in it.
Assign a number to represent the intensity of the first moment of experience by comparing it with the base. For example, if the first moment seems closest in intensity to the 8 pleasure, call it 8. Continue down the line, assigning a new number each time the intensity changes-that is, each time it changes so much that it becomes closest to a different base experience. Notice how much time elapses between changes. Once you have finished, multiply each number by the duration of that experience, then add the products. The sum will represent the state of affair's overall hedonic value.
xx All this might sound good, but it doesn't give us a method for assessing hedonic value. Let me explain why.
The procedure for assigning base numbers is problematic. It must be quite a rare event in history when someone in excruciating agony feels gradually better to the point of ecstasy. If the rate of improvement is really constant throughout, then probably this has never happened. So the procedure for setting base numbers must be a mere thought experiment. But if that's all it is, it's useless. The human imagination is inadequate to grasp exactly what experiences -1, -2, -3 etc. are all like, sitting in our chairs or lying in our beds. And even if we were more imaginative, different people would imagine the base subject's experiences changing at different rates, thus destroying the possibility of a publicly usable number system. Also, we are told to confirm that the subject in this experiment felt better at a constant rate by verifying that she is indifferent among various alternatives. But how can do we this, when the "subject" doesn't exist? One way or another, we'll have to fall back and then collapse on the crutch of our poor, strained imaginations.
To show how hopeless this enterprise is, suppose we have an idealized situation that we can't have; suppose this were more than a thought experiment. Let's say you will be in agony, and somehow you know that you will be improving at a constant rate until you're in ecstasy. Further suppose you know that this will take an hour, and that in precisely 42 minutes your mental state will be perfectly neutral between pleasure and unpleasure. So you know that in 42 minutes your experience will be a 0 experience; in 42 minutes and 5 seconds your experience will be a 1 Familiar problems also arise for assessing the experiences of others. Even if the implementer of the "method" has a good grasp of the base numbers, how could she judge the intensity-levels of others' experiences? There are ways, of course. We make estimates from others' vague qualitative verbal reports; from their revealed preferences; from their moans, groans, sighs, and how vulgar their curse words are; from the objective stimuli causing their experiences, when these exist, and so on. However, all this is imprecise, and often the implementer will have little of it to go on.
Moreover, such problems are magnified when assessing the experiences of animals and infants.
xxiii Another fact makes the prospects of a calculus even dimmer. As I've formulated the "method," we assign new numbers every five seconds when setting the base intensity figures. But numbers should probably be assigned more often. Arntzenius and McCarthy have proved that there can be differences in hedonic intensity too small to introspect. xxiv Thus, there are probably thousands of different base levels that need to be represented with different numbers. And so our feeble imaginations, memories, vocabularies, and powers of judgment will be strained even worse as we try to implement the procedure.
Hence, we have no method for determining hedonic value; we have no hedonic calculus.
Have I been attacking a straw man? Perhaps no one thinks we actually have a calculus; it's just that there could be such a thing "in principle." I have several things to say about this. So even then our problems wouldn't be solved, just profitably reconceptualized.
Third, suppose someone says the idea is just that God could perform hedonic calculationsnot that we can, or ever will. That might be true, but it is hardly worth saying more than once, and it doesn't seem to be what the references to Bentham are getting at.
In general, the way we discuss "the hedonic calculus" is misleading. Our actual methods of hedonic evaluation-if they are "methods"-are a hodgepodge of strategies in which judgment is prior to calculation and even simple assessments are often rough or inaccurate. 'The hedonic calculus'-that swaggering, vainglorious phrase-has all the wrong connotations. We might wish that our methods were precise and "scientific", but they aren't.
The hedonic calculus is a joke.
Thesis 4: An important type of pleasure is background pleasure.
Qualia are the qualitative or phenomenological aspects of experience: the way the ashtray looks, the way the cigar tastes, the way the ace of spades feels, the way the other players smell, and so on. When you're not in dreamless sleep, you enjoy (or sometimes you are subjected to) a continuous stream of qualia. This is what it means to sit in the Cartesian theater: there is something it is like to be you.
Most qualia, or most of their aspects, are in the theatrical background, unreflected upon, upstaged by more striking or salient experiences. As Leibniz says, the uniform sounds of a mill or a waterfall may be perceived but unnoticed because they are "too unvarying." xxv I associate this phenomenon with air conditioners and dishwashers: I hear them but am not conscious of hearing them.
When we think of pleasurable qualia, we usually think of foreground pleasures. But background pleasures are more common. In fact, it is relatively rare for us to attend to our experiences.
Background pleasures have never, to my knowledge, been discussed as a class, but sometimes philosophers have had them in mind. Mill contrasts "the occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment" with "its permanent and steady flame." xxvi The brilliant flash sounds hard to miss-a foreground pleasure-while the permanent flame might go unnoticed, despite its continuous value.
Mill's steady flame may be Sidgwick's "more indefinite kind of pleasure, which is an important element of ordinary human happiness,-the 'well-feeling' that accompanies and is a sign of physical well-being" xxvii (and, I would add, of psychological well-being).
Background pleasures are not defined qualitatively. Like foreground pleasures, they can differ phenomenologically: unreflected upon joy differs from unreflected upon contentment or pride, and instances of these may vary in intensity. (Don't think of qualia as moods; qualia are qualitative while moods-for example, being cheerful or irritable-consist at least partly in behavioral dispositions.) Qualitatively distinct background pleasures also arise from different senseorgans. Oliver Sacks, for instance, quotes a patient who lost his sense of smell:
Sense of smell? I never gave it a thought. You don't normally give it a thought. But when I lost it-it was like being struck blind. Life lost a good deal of its savour-one doesn't realise how much 'savour' is smell. You smell people, you smell books, you smell the city, you smell the spring-maybe not consciously, but as a rich unconscious background to everything else. My whole world was suddenly radically poorer. (Chisholm) (D) pleasures that people don't deserve.
"The sight of a being who is not graced by any touch of a pure and good will but who yet enjoys an uninterrupted prosperity can never delight a rational and impartial spectator.
Thus a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of being even worthy of happiness." xxxix (Kant) Philosophers have also considered some unpleasures to be good: those taken in bad intentional objects; those accompanying bad behavior; and those that are deserved. Philosophers who believe the first typically say that displeasure taken in bad intentional objects is good. This may be for two reasons: 'displeasure' connotes disapproval, which is appropriately directed at bad things, and 'displeasure' suggests mild unpleasure, while suffering always seems bad. Curiously, I don't think anyone has endorsed the analogue of (C); no one has said that unpleasures are good which depend on true beliefs. But if (C) is true-if pleasures derived from cognitively defective sources are badwhy shouldn't unpleasures derived from cognitively laudable sources be good? Perhaps philosophers who believe (C) also believe its analogue, even if they haven't said so.
Are ( pleasure. This concept, however, is wildly permissive; on it, any state of affairs that doesn't entail pain would be intrinsic to countlessly many pleasures. For example, the fact that a coliseum exists would be intrinsic to the pleasure, Andy Kaufman was delighted as he ridiculed wrestling fans in the Mid-South Coliseum. Another, more natural, concept of pleasure also admits intrinsic intentional objects. If I say, "Eating chocolate is one of life's pleasures," then a pleasure is, in that sense, a source of pleasure, or an activity that typically affords pleasurable experience. And my belief that this is chocolate, as I'm eating, might be intrinsic to this episode of chocolate eating.
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However, I am using 'pleasure' to refer to pleasurable experiences. So in asking whether intentional objects can be intrinsic to pleasures, I am asking whether, say, the sadist's belief that I'm suffering is intrinsic to the pleasure he takes in it. I won't try to answer this question, but the standard view is that beliefs are not intrinsic to experiences. So A*-the idea that pleasure taken in bad objects is intrinsically bad-is suspect on metaphysical grounds alone.
(A) is better amplified as:
(A**): Pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object is intrinsically bad. (Here "pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object" names a state of affairs that entails the existence of both pleasure and a distinct intentional object. xlii )
Why might A** be true? Not because "pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object" entails that a bad object exists, for it doesn't; if Lex Luthor believes that Superman suffered, he may take pleasure in that belief even if it's false. A** is probably motivated by:
(m) "Pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object" entails that an intrinsically bad relation exists, namely, an inappropriate way in which a pleasure and a bad object relate.
And supporters of A** will affirm one of the following:
(m1) "Pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object" entails that pleasure exists, a state of affairs that is good; but its value is outweighed by the disvalue of the intrinsically bad relation's existing. xliii 21 (m2) "Pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object" entails that pleasure exists, a state of affairs that is either neutral under the circumstances or that contributes disvalue to the larger state of affairs.
On (m2), pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object is an organic whole. As I said in section 2, the value of such wholes does not equal the summed value of their parts. Here the whole has less value than its parts, since the existence of pleasure does not contribute value to the larger wholeindeed it may contribute disvalue-whereas normally or in isolation the existence of pleasure is good.
Is A** true; is pleasure's being taken in a bad intentional object intrinsically bad? Carson thinks so, saying, "I am convinced by the arguments of Brentano and others," xliv but the literature lacks convincing arguments. Philosophers either assert A**, offer A** as intuitively compelling, or assert (m1) or (m2) in support of A**. xlv I won't try to assess A**. I'll restrict myself to discussing the value of pleasure, not pleasure relations, so I'll just argue against (m2) that pleasure is good even when taken in bad objects.
xlvi Nobody, to my knowledge, has argued that pleasures taken in the bad lack value. Many philosophers, however, find that view compelling, perhaps because "There is no sign more infallible of an entirely bad heart, and of profound moral worthlessness," Here is the best objection to the argument: "The pleasures of generalized euphoria are not 'good merely because they feel good.' They're good because they feel good and because they're not taken in bad objects. So, we can't conclude that pleasures in bad company are good." Response:
"Given that such euphoria has no object, object-talk is irrelevant to its value. Its goodness resides in its feel; describing what it's like suffices to account for its value. And experiencing such pleasure suffices for us to understand its value." liii This response, I think, is better than the objection. If so, then the argument supports thesis 5: pleasures are good even in bad company.
Thesis 6: Higher pleasures aren't pleasures (and if they were, they wouldn't be higher).
As a young man, John Stuart Mill believed that pleasure is ultimately the only good thing. Later he changed his view, but he never changed his language. His use of 'pleasure' simply expanded to include everything he thought relevant to welfare.
In Utilitarianism, Mill supposedly endorses qualitative hedonism, the doctrine that some pleasures are qualitatively better than others. These so-called "higher pleasures" are superior to "lower pleasures," not because they're more intense or produce more push-pin utility, but because they're superior in kind. Utilitarianism is the locus classicus for understanding the higher/lower pleasure distinction, I
conclude that higher pleasures are not pleasures: they're ways of life.
Let's now use 'pleasure' normally. We can distinguish higher and lower pleasures in any of four ways.
First, we can define higher pleasures as those preferred by competent judges. For example, we can say that one pleasure is higher than another just in case most competent judges prefer it qua feeling. And we can add that those judges must be able to fully appreciate both pleasures and cannot base their preference on facts about duration or intensity.
There is a big literature on competent judges. However, none of it gives us any reason to think that such judges would recognize the existence of higher pleasures. If the judges truly focus on the pleasures themselves, ignoring all extrinsic factors, they may well care only about intensity and duration.
Second, we can define higher pleasures as those taken in "higher" things, while lower pleasures are those taken in "lower" things. The "higher" things are normally thought to be intellectual, moral, or distinctively human, while the corresponding "lower" things are bodily, immoral (or amoral?) and animalistic. On this definition, a higher pleasure is a pleasure that keeps good company: the company of higher objects. Thus the arguments of the last section apply here. Just as pleasures have a value that cannot be diminished by bad company, so they have a value that cannot be augmented by good company. I take no stand on whether pleasures combined with good company can constitute organic wholes.
Third, we can define higher pleasures as those taken in higher forms of behavior, while lower pleasures are taken in lower forms of behavior. (Here Moore's example of a lower pleasure comes to mind: breaking the crockery while drunk. lviii ) This suggestion is much like the second. The "higher" activities are thought to be intellectual, moral, or human; while the "lower" activities are bodily, immoral and animalistic. Higher pleasures are again keeping good company: that of higher behavior. And again, my arguments suggest that the pleasures themselves cannot get value from their concomitants, though together they may form an organic unity.
Fourth, we can define higher pleasures as pleasures that have an intrinsic advantage over lower pleasures, but not that of greater intensity or duration. This proposal comports with how qualitative hedonism is usually understood: higher pleasures are better, even when they're less intense.
This idea may seem puzzling, since it may seem impossible for a pleasure to be better qua experience without being more intense. Intensity, after all, is a broad evaluative notion; to say that a pleasure is more intense is just to say that it's better qua feeling. Thus, the notion of intensity may not seem to leave room for other intrinsic advantages. How could a pleasure be intrinsically better than another except as feeling?
Hutcheson provides a clue. He says,
We have an immediate sense of a dignity, a perfection, or beatifick quality in some kinds [of pleasure], which no intenseness of the lower kinds can equal, were they also as lasting as we could wish.
lix
To me "a perfection, a beatifick quality" suggests beauty. Perhaps the superiority of higher pleasures is aesthetic. Higher pleasures aren't better qua feeling-better for the subject of the experience-but aesthetically better.
This idea at least makes sense. Beauty is not just a property of music and faces; pleasures can be beautiful too. In fact, the pleasurable experience of hearing beautiful music or seeing a 27 beautiful face is typically beautiful. (Perhaps we attribute beauty to music and faces because our experiences of them are beautiful?) I won't worry about whether beautiful pleasures closely correspond to the "higher" mental and moral pleasures, but they may not.
If the higher/lower distinction is merely aesthetic, it may seem to lack importance.
Should we strive to have aesthetically higher pleasures, just so there will be more such things?
Here we must ignore the fact that beautiful pleasures can provide pleasure; appreciating the beauty of our pleasures can make them more intense (or can provide different, pleasurable experiences). The more general form of this question is whether we should strive to create beautiful objects, irrespective of any pleasure they bring. I can't do this question justice, but most philosophers would say no, and I agree.
In conclusion, I see no reason to think that so-called higher pleasures, however they are conceived, are really higher in the sense of being intrinsically better than so-called lower pleasures.
lx Stuart Rachels
University of Alabama
